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James opened proceedings with an introduction to PowerSwitch. The point of the organisation, which has been going since the autumn of 2004, is to raise awareness of our energy and climate future. Their work seeks to get people to see the implications of energy scarcity and global warming, whilst trying to avert a typical 'doom and gloom' response from the public. James is aware of the difficulties in this - as he says, "There will be no miracle".

A major target is critical mass - the organisation will seek, hand in hand with other Peak Oil organisations and individuals, to publicise Peak Oil (henceforth 'PO') in an attempt to reach the much wider audience that successful change requires.

Although this is a great challenge, already some inroads are being made, including PowerSwitch's gaining the interest of a number of Members of Parliament. There is now a joint committee in the planning stages, with advocates from both the Labour and Liberal Democrats.

Indeed events have moved so well that this is the second conference since last autumn, and already a larger one in Central London is planned for this autumn (The End of Oil... and its consequences for the economy, food supply and climate change, a on-day conference, sponsored by PowerSwitch, Sustain, CRed, and East Anglia Food Link, to be held on October 11th, chaired by Dr Ian Gibson MP, with speakers including Michael Meacher MP; Chris Skrebowski, editor Petroleum Review; Tim Lang, professor of Food Policy at City University; Andrew Simms of the new economic foundation; and Richard Douthwaite, author of When the Wells Run Dry).

James kept his introduction short and introduced the first public screening of:

A reporter from FromTheWilderness got the ball rolling with tales of CIA interest in the PO whistleblowers. Whilst this may be true, it seems an odd way to try and widen public awareness (the presumed point of the documentary), as we all know the public are shy of conspiracy theories if they are presented upfront.

There follows film of Colin making presentations on PO in Switzerland; a montage on US arrogance and overuse of resources; and pieces on 9/11 and Dick Cheney, which sought to link (pretty successfully) the PO idea to these recent events in US foreign policy. The consequences of this link between oil resource depletion and US militarism were predicted to include the spread of the current Mid-East crisis throughout the region, and then into the oil rich parts of Africa and South America.

After this a brief run-down on the nature of the crisis is given, using statistics on, for example, North Sea oil. The oil fields in the North Sea were discovered over a period of time, the peak year of discovery being 1973. After this less and less was discovered, presumably as less and less was there to discover. By 1999, i.e. 6 years ago, the UK's North Sea oil was deemed to be past peak, and has had a 6% per annum reduction in production since. The Norwegian’s have also reached a similar predicament, and a Norwegian oilman presented his views of Hubbert's Peak and the rundown of his industry. It appears that the US situation is worse, in that their discovery peak was 1920 and their production peak 1970. Colin's view is that a global peak in production will be hit by 2010, with a 2.3% per annum drop off from there.

The consequences of this scenario are likely to include a much more volatile market, with extreme fluctuations in price at the top of the market. Indeed, Colin contends that this is already occurring in the markets, indicating that peak is indeed more or less upon us. Global economic shockwaves are inevitable, and will be exacerbated by the US and Europe, whose populations have a Grow Or Die ethic and whose consumerist culture is driven by oil.

Thus, at this point in the documentary, a market analyst is enlisted to give his opinion. He was quite bullish, expressing the view that whilst share prices would drop, companies that responded quickly, perhaps investing in alternative technologies, should experience a stock price rise.

Chris Skrebowski, editor of Petroleum Review, spoke about who would get fuel during a crisis. Not surprisingly he expected the lion's share to go to the military and the police. He predicted that the price would run away and lead to states going bankrupt unless fairly vicious controls were introduced (presumably on people as well as on markets).

Although, inevitably, many of the conclusions are negative, the documentary offers the belief that awareness and engagement will soften the crash. Financial institutions are waking up to the problems, and indeed are well ahead of the public on the risks, but oil companies still, on average, appear to be working on a 'business at usual' footing.

A syndrome of political denial is also noted, perhaps motivated, in the main, to avert panic. The MP's, therefore, that do listen and respond to the issue tend not to be front benchers. Those that do, also seem quite aware that the Iraq War prefigures the global instability to come, as the economy's lifeblood runs low.

Colin notes Darwin on the survival of the fittest, and remarks one "can win a battle but can you really win a war?". I read this as meaning that a predator species is bullish and gets into fights, and it is no matter how much foresight he may or may not have. The implication may be that a species that avoids battles and is more cautious about his resource use could win the war despite what one might expect. He was not crystal clear on this view, however, and I for one am uncomfortable with rhetoric involving the extreme views often imputed to Darwin. So, at this point, I'd have appreciated some clarity.

Colin puts over the concept that PO is 'imposed by nature' rather than being an industry conspiracy to massage prices. He thinks such a perception important, as when prices rocket it is important that the public has some sympathy rather than resentment - the latter makes more conflict inevitable, and such would hamper efforts to cope with the crisis.

To hammer the PO problem home, the DVD is rounded off with a reminder that the biggest impact of a fuel crisis will be on those with the most profligate lifestyle. Next to America, that is us.

Overall, this DVD is a good introduction to PO for the lay public. As noted, my main reservation is the inclusion, at the very beginning of the film, of views on the close surveillance of those who seek to publicise PO. They would perhaps be better placed near the end, given the likelihood that some viewers might zone out as soon as a conspiracy-theory flavour is put over. Nearer the end, having heard the arguments, they may be more receptive to, and more ready to give credence to, the idea that the men-in-black are paying attention to ASPO (i.e.: it makes perfect sense that they would, if you understand the nature of the PO crisis, which, for those not already converted, will include the viewer of the DVD only once the main argument has been made).

Norman is an ex-post office worker who has relocated to a rural idyll near Taunton in Devon, in the south-west of England. A major motivation for him in doing this is a desire to not be in an urban area when the system crashes. He believes this to be inevitable, in the UK, at least, in a PO scenario. He has based this pessimistic view, in part, on the events in the UK during 2000, when there was a fuel strike, with refineries blockaded and no fuel reaching the pumps across the nation. The speech he made is available in full here on blue, see.

He began by noting the world population of 6.5 billion people. He then talked about the systems that are needed to feed them, and the interdependent nature of the elements of the system. Relevant to this is large scale distribution, using networks that are characterised by automation, mechanisation, and computer reliant co-ordination. All of this infrastructure is sensitively dependent upon fossil fuels - indeed, such modern infrastructure post-dates the 1850's oil rush in the US, as it was simply not possible to develop a global network of the type we now have without an energy source like oil. Ditto power provision, banking and telecoms, all critical infrastructures that are interdependent and reliant on oil - PO will be a body blow.

Norman's view is that a fuel shortage will cause these to crash very quickly, and that such a crash equals a recession, if not a depression, at best in the short term, at worst long term. He is slightly optimistic regarding electricity networks in the UK, as we are more dependent on coal and nuclear powered stations to supply the grid than many countries. However, transport infrastructure is in peril. It is here that his background as a post office worker is relevant to the views he has come to hold - during the UK fuel crisis of 2000 he saw the transport infrastructure begin to crumble in just a few short days. He also noted that health care and food distribution systems began to crash during the crisis as well - and the strike was over in a mere 13 days.

Projected over a longer period Norman expects to see power-plant energy generation to be hit, even if they are not burning oil, as parts will fail and will not easily be replaced. He expects non-electronic money movements to be stopped up as well, having a massive affect on markets.

The public response would be panic buying, exacerbating the crisis. Supermarkets, too, use the JIT system. During the 2000 fuel crisis supermarket shelves emptied of staples within a couple of days, bread and milk first. Petrol stations experienced long queues on the basis of early rumours, so they were depleted even faster than expected (and it was expected, as UK fuel reserves are low). The Times newspaper ran the headline "Panic Buying: 4 Meals Away From Anarchy"! And we were. My experience matches Norman's - during the strike the three major supermarkets were out of milk, bread, and beans, not to mention toilet paper, in less than two days; all the petrol stations in town were out of unleaded almost immediately, and were charging the earth before that. I was lucky - we had a small food and fuel stock, and as the rumours hit I went to a small rural petrol station I knew and filled up relatively cheaply even as those who didn't know their own county stayed in town for fuel, and, erm, stayed in town.

Norman's view is that early action is needed - indeed, action now, before the next time - but that the political system is not geared up to deal with long-term, or even medium-term, decisions, in large part as a function of the fact that politicians have their eye on the short-term horizon (the next election) and are unwilling to make themselves unpopular by bringing in controls before a crisis exists. No doubt the 'war on terror' is very convenient in this regard, as illustrated by their using it to justify sending a pamphlet to every UK household telling us to keep a food supply of at least three weeks stock 'in case of attack'.

Norman rounded off with a pessimistic metaphor, the lifeboat. He has run for the hills already and advocates us doing so too. Unsurprisingly, he drew a little flack for that. My take on Norman is that his description of the problem is spot on, but his prescriptions for dealing with it are suspect. He does, though, very much represent Everyman - the 'average' British 'tabloid reader' would do the same things, and we desperately need to educate that response out of people unless we wish to merely succeed in pouring petrol on the flames (well, not petrol, we won't have any...).

Tully Wakeman, on Oil & World Agriculture

Tully came from East Anglia Food Link, and spoke on our reliance on energy for food. He began by reminding us that all our food is, in effect, converted solar energy, and that the efficiency was very low, at a maximum of 2%. He described the post-50's trend in agriculture of using fossil fuels to create artificial fertilisers in order to boost food production, quoting the statistic that the average US citizen requires 400 US gallons of oil per year just to feed him or her (this figure including the fertilizer; irrigation; transportation; packaging; and kitchen preparations such as cooking and refrigeration).

He further noted that this 400 gallons per head equated to one third of all energy used, and claimed that a 30% reduction could be achieved just by going organic. He also advocated composting of much of the 'waste' that most of us unthinkingly chuck away.

Another tactic suggested was halting 'aquifer mining', as our water tables are dropping, and, even if they were not, are under threat from sea level rise. Irrigation costs are set to rise inexorably, so doing something now is a necessity.

Tully's message is that our food system is a bubble, and, like any other market in such a condition, is primed for collapse. Our unsustainable farming practices merely cause the bubble to keep expanding, and already we are seeing the signs of stress, in, for example, an increase in global grain shortages and a decrease in yields. He says that population growth has outstripped harvest growth.

A decentring of urban populations, onto small-holdings that farm organically, is a major part of Tully's solution to a crisis we cannot avert. Crops would be locally produced; there would be no packaging; local transport (probably rail) via local hubs would create local markets for the public to go to with minimal need for extra transportation; there would be more allotments and gardens with livestock. Re-skilling is an urgent priority, in gardening / farming, and in pre-industrial techniques of living off the land. He also advocates a protectionist national economic policy, to stop prices and availability of food being driven by the markets; that CAP push harder for growth in fertility of soils in Europe; and that we make our target food self-sufficiency (as individuals and as a nation). His optimistic end note was that we could "feed the world" if we started now.

He did not speak about wider ecological issues resulting from the increase of extra-urban land use, so I cannot comment on his position on the question, but am interested in the answer (I doubt he has not thought about the sustainability of an ecology that does even more damage to biodiversity, but his idea of spreading urban populations more thinly across the land well might do such damage).

The first of two presentations by David Fleming was on Uranium depletion. He made a good case for nuclear power being a seriously bad idea on a technical level.

Whilst Uranium is abundant in nature, it is rare in high enough concentrations to mine without using as much or more energy to get at it as can be extracted from it in a power plant. This negative energy balance makes it financially non-viable to build many more nuclear power stations. They take 10 years to build and Uranium reserves are already dwindling. Current energy from nuclear plants equates to 2.5% of global energy supply, and it is David's contention that even at this low rate, we have enough ore for another 40 years power generation from this source.

Also, the 'costs' of nuclear power have been 'subsidised' by industry through the expedient of simply not dealing with nuclear waste. This puts off till tomorrow some extremely high costs (not just financial, as the wastes are dangerous - generation wastes will kill you if you stand unprotected next to a chunk for 2 minutes). If you factor in the costs of building a plant (I gather the first 20 years of energy produced merely covers the input from the build) and of decommissioning, then there is no way that the industry can pay for it at all.

As the Uranium supplies dwindle, it becomes a sellers market, so costs spiral. Much ore is available only from politically unstable areas, so that military solutions are likely to be adopted by certain nations in order to safeguard access. And the cheap and quick nuclear plant building plan that the US is expressing an interest in is likely to lead to more accidents, less skilled staff, and dodgy security - the latter making nuclear terrorism even more likely. To avert these outcomes would make the costs of building, running, and decommissioning new plants even more prohibitive. Yet still the US government talks up nuclear.

David also appreciates the problems of large-scale energy production for communities, both from the perspective of stripping financial assets from the masses to the top of the capital pyramid and from the perspective of denying local control over energy provision. Local control is increasingly important as the national grid becomes less reliable.

The second subject that David spoke about was DTQ's or Domestic Tradable Quotas. This is a kind of cross between an investment trust mechanism and rationing. It struck me that it may require war economy type measures from government to force public acceptance, but this is likely to occur anyway, so may not be an obstacle to DTQ's.

Chris ran through the various energy sources that the UK economy relies upon. Primarily these are natural gas; petroleum; coal; and nuclear, with renewables a long way behind.

Electricity supply is a binary source - you have a useable stream of energy to your home, or none at all, there are no half-measures. So, supply interruptions have massive consequences. PO is not going to be an immediate and direct problem, as much energy for electricity production does not come from oil fired plants, though, of course, less direct infrastrutural problems will impact electrical supply too.

A run-through of energy that feeds into electricity production goes like this:

nuclear power is set to lose 70% of current capacity by 2015, due to decommissioning (they take 10 years to build and none are underway), and is, anyway, imperilled by rising sea levels;

gas seems OK, as the reserves we have are large, but we reached peak in 2003; we only have 13 days storage back-up; we had supply interruption during the last (mild, so low demand) winter; and we currently use one-sixth of the whole North Sea reserve per year (!), so increasingly relying upon imports from outside the UK (80% imports by 2020) - thus supplies are interruptible, and prices are rising (a 50% wholesale price rise is expected this year, 15% for the consumer market), and, despite new pipelines to handle the capacity we will need to import, we will be head to head with other states in bidding for it;

coal is a source we are 50% self-sufficient in, but we only have sulphurous coal in the UK, which is very dirty - to meet EU regulations on emissions (of SO², NO² and CO²) the cost would be very high; and

renewables, which supply a mere 3% of our energy today, yet have a supposed 20% target for 2020. Renewable provision is planned, in fact 17,000 Megawatts of supply are awaiting planning permissions. However, even if achieved, the supply is intermittent (if the wind drops, the sky clouds over...). Thus we must adjust our demand to cope (e.g., use battery back-up in critical devices; use 'smart' devices chipped to react to power fluctuations, so the TV switches off but the fridge stays on; etc).

Chris expresses the expectation that domestic supply will begin to suffer fluctuations right now - it was only the nature of current domestic contracts for provision that averted fluctuations and brown-outs and price hikes last winter, all of which did hit industry. 50% of current supply levels are seriously in question within 10-15 years (yet demand still is rising!).

Rosamund has contacted us and asked for some amendments (below in red, my responses in blue)